Introduction
The use of human fetal tissue for research and therapy continues to cause concern and provoke debate. In the US President Bush recently announced that such tissue cannot be used for research if it results from induced abortion (1) .
In 1972 an advisory group, chaired by Sir John Peel, published its Report on the Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material for Research (2) . Appended to the report was a recommended Code of Practice which was subsequently implemented in both NHS hospitals and private abortion clinics. In 1988, in the light of developments in the field of human tissue transplantation and medical research, the Department of Health established a committee to review the Peel Report and in particular to consider whether any modifications should be made to its Code of Practice (3) . Chaired by the Reverend Dr John Polkinghome (4), the committee reported in July 1989 and proposed a revised Code of Practice (5) . The Department of Health promptly commended the new code to NHS hospitals and private abortion facilities (6) .
So substantial are the Polkinghorne Committee's revisions of the Peel Code that it has in effect produced a fresh code. While commendably remedying most of the old code's deficiencies, the Polkinghome Report nevertheless invites several criticisms. This paper considers the committee's reasoning in relation to three issues: the moral status of the living fetus in utero before implantation and of the living fetus ex utero; parental consent; and the ethical interrelation of the use of the fetus and abortion (7) .
I. The use of the fetus for research and therapy 'It is unethical to administer drugs or carry out any procedures during pregnancy with the intent of ascertaining whether or not they might harm the fetus' (8) .
The above definition of 'fetus' (9) is narrower than that in the Peel Code in that it does not include the pre-implantation embryo. The report explains that embryo research had already been considered by the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, chaired by Dame Mary Wamock (10) .
It is arguably an odd justification for avoiding discussion of a relevant matter that it has already been the subject of consideration, unless perhaps that consideration has been exhaustive and conclusive, epithets which even the most ardent supporter of the Wamock Committee's recommendations would hesitate to apply to its analysis of the moral status of the early embryo (11). Moreover, the Wamock Committee focused on the status of the embryo in vitro, not in vivo.
Further, the moral reasoning leading the Polkinghome Committee to accord respect to the fetus after implantation, which is set out below, seems no less applicable to the pre-implantation embryo. Indeed, the committee refers at one point to the respect due to the fetus 'at every stage of its development'. (12) Finally, the report does not explain what it understands by 'implantation': is it referring to the beginning of the process (at the end of the first week) or to its conclusion (before the end of the second) (13)?
The second of the above paragraphs of the new code essentially reproduces a paragraph in the original code. The Polkinghome Report condones the exposure of the fetus in utero (and, indeed, the fetus ex utero) to even 'greater than minimal' risk of unintentional harm in the course of non-therapeutic research (14) . It omits, however, to justify such exposure.
THE LIVING FETUS EX UTERO
'The live fetus, whether in utero or ex utero, ... should be treated on principles broadly similar to those which apply to treatment and research conducted with children and adults' (15 'If an aborted fetus is alive it is a person, no matter how short the period of gestation, and using it for an experiment would in law be at least an assault upon it. If doctors wish to perform these experiments legally they must seek statutory authority' (16 (19) . The new code accordingly provides that research on the fetus should be governed by principles 'broadly similar' to those applicable to research on children and adults (20) .
The report observes that intervention on a living fetus should only carry a minimal risk of harm or, if a greater risk is involved, that the intervention is on balance for the benefit of the fetus. It then states that with trial procedures involving greater than minimal risk which may be of great potential benefit to the group to which the subject of the trial belongs, the ethical issues must be considered in a manner 'broadly similar' to the way they are considered in relation to children and adults (21 Secondly, is potentiality a sufficient criterion for moral worth, particularly when the potentiality of one fetus can later be replaced by that of another? Even if potentiality is a valid criterion, why should it entitle the fetus to be treated in a 'broadly similar' way to a 'fully-developed' human being? (22) Moreover, what is the moral status of a fetus which does not enjoy this potential because, for example, it suffers from a condition which will result in neonatal death? Indeed, is it not the case that every living pre-viable fetus lacks, by definition, the potential to develop into a fully-formed individual? And, it could be argued, if it is doomed anyway why not use it for research?
Thirdly, the recommendations are too often couched in vague terms. What, precisely, is meant by the fetus enjoying a moral status 'broadly comparable' to an adult, and by applying 'broadly similar' principles to both in the context of research, and by 'minimal' and 'more than minimal' risk?
Fourthly, the report asserts that it is unethical to use a fetus instrumentally but assumes (as did Peel) that a mother can give an ethically effective consent to non-therapeutic research. It makes no attempt to reconcile this apparent inconsistency nor to address the ethical arguments which have been advanced against allowing any non-therapeutic research on children, let alone research involving minimal and more than minimal risk (23) .
Finally, the recommendations assume (as did Peel) that a mother can give a legally effective consent to non-therapeutic research involving a minimal and, evidently, an even greater than minimal risk to the fetus. It is at least doubtful whether this is the case (24) .
The last two points lead on to consideration of whether the consent of the mother and/or father is ethically and/or legally desirable.
II. Consent ' The written consent of the mother must be obtained before any research or therapy involving the fetus or fetal tissue takes place. Sufficient explanation should be offered to make the act of consent valid' (25).
The code adds that consent to abortion must be obtained before consent to the use of the fetus and without reference to the possibility of that use (26).
It also provides that consent should be obtained to any proposed tests on the fetus for transmissible disease (27). The code states that paternal consent is not a prerequisite to fetal use (28).
The Peel Code drew criticism for not requiring the informed consent of the mother to the use of her fetus. Polkinghorne's recommendations meet this criticism and, it is submitted, properly respect the mother's interests in the fate of her fetus. However, the report is nevertheless open to criticism, firstly for omitting to answer satisfactorily certain objections to any requirement of maternal consent and, secondly, for its reasoning rejecting the case for a requirement of paternal consent or, at least, consultation.
MATERNAL CONSENT
The committee rejected the argument that allowing the mother to consent to the use of the fetus is like asking a murderer to consent to the use of his victim. It preferred the view that because abortion is a decision of 'moral ambiguity and perplexity to many, reached only through a conflict of considerations' it was too harsh a judgement of the mother's relation to her fetus to suppose that she was no longer in a 'special position' with regard to it (29) .
However, the committee did not address the associated objection that, although the mother's proxy consent to research on her child is normally required, this is because it is presumed that she has the best interests of the child at heart, and that this presumption does not apply in the case of the mother who has decided to reject the child by abortion, at least for other than a grave reason.
Professor Ramsey concludes, with reference to research on the living pre-viable fetus, that it is 'morally outrageous ... to designate women who elect abortion for comparatively trivial reasons, or for social convenience or economic betterment, to the socially responsible role or ascribe to them the decisional competence and deputyship to say whether the abortus should or should not be used in medical experimentation' (30) .
This objection has been extended by Bopp and Burtchaell to the dead fetus: 'The very agents of someone's death are surely disqualified to act on the behalf or in the stead of the victim -disqualified as a man who has killed his wife is morally disqualified from acting as her executor'. They add that if the mother is to be regarded not as the guardian of the fetus but as its next-of-kin, this is an 'ominous innovation: that within one's lifetime another person be legally permitted to assume authority, not as a protector exercising protective care, but as a survivor acting in her own interests' (31) .
Whether this would be such an 'ominous innovation' is, however, open to question: would it differ from asking a wife shortly before the death of her husband if she had any objection to his organs being transplanted? In relation to the living fetus, by contrast, Ramsey's point appears to have some force: should the committee not have considered whether the woman who has aborted the fetus is an appropriate person to safeguard its interests?
PATERNAL CONSENT
In rejecting a requirement of paternal consent, the committee states that the father's case for being consulted rests, as does that of the mother, on respect rather than on the law and that his consent is not required for an abortion. Both of these statements are open to criticism, the first for being inaccurate, the second for being irrelevant.
First, if the fetus dies after live birth then, as the Peel Code recognises, the Human Tissue Act 1961 applies. This Act makes provision for the use of parts of the body for therapy or research and allows the person lawfully in possession of the body to authorise the use of the body for these respective purposes provided that he or she, having made such reasonable enquiry as may be practicable, has no reason to believe that any surviving relative of the deceased objects to such use (32) . Consequently, the absence of paternal consultation could result in the removal of fetal tissue not being authorised by the Act (33) .
Secondly, while it is true that the father's consent is not required for an abortion (34) the relevance of this is not explained. It certainly does not follow that because the father is denied a veto on abortion he should therefore be denied a veto on the use of the abortus.
One argument for his involvement is that tests on the fetus may have implications for him. The committee, while acknowledging this, nevertheless concludes that his consent should not be required because his relationship with the fetus is 'less intimate' than that of the mother (35), a conclusion which is both vague and a non sequitur.
What is meant by 'less intimate'? Does it imply that the mother is more concerned than the father 'The decision to carry out an abortion must be reached without consideration of the benefits of subsequent use. The generation or termination of pregnancy to produce suitable material is unethical' (37).
The code adds that the management of the mother's pregnancy should not be influenced by the prospective use of the fetus (38) and that no inducements should be offered to the mother to abort or allow the fetus to be used (39) . Nor should she be informed of the specific use which may be made of fetal tissue, or whether it is to be used at all (40).
COMPLICITY IN PAST ABORTIONS
The committee rejects the argument that abortion is so immoral that it taints beyond acceptability any beneficial use of the fetal material so obtained. It concludes that this would only be arguable if the abortion were an act of 'very great moral turpitude' and that in the circumstances envisaged by the Abortion Act 1967 abortion is only permitted where there are other serious moral issues to be considered, such as concern for the health of the mother (41) . It observes that in circumstances of such moral complexity, it is not right to regard abortion as inevitably so heinous that any use of the fetal tissue gained thereby is immoral and adds that although in particular cases there may be disagreement about whether the moral factors have been properly weighed this does not allow as general conclusions either that abortion is generally wrong or that as a result the beneficial use of fetal tissue compounds this wrongfulness. It also points out that the use of fetal tissue has been justified by analogy with the use of organs which become available as the result of a careless accident or even murder (42) .
This discussion of moral complicity is unsatisfactory. It is not clear why the committee rejects the argument from complicity: is it because abortion is not an act of 'very great moral turpitude' or is it because, even if it is, use of the resultant tissue does not amount to complicity? If the former, then the committee's apparent assumption that abortions carried out (ostensibly) under the Abortion Act 1967 are not immoral surely requires justification, particularly in the light of evidence indicating that the bulk of abortions are performed for social rather than health reasons and of the admission by the Act's promoter that abortion is being used as a contraceptive (43) .
If, alternatively, the committee rejects the argument from complicity on the ground that use of fetal tissue is no more immoral than the use of the corpse of a murder victim, should not the committee have considered whether a truer analogy would have been with institutionalised homicide? As LeRoy Walters has written:
'If a particular hospital became the beneficiary of an organised homicide-system which provided a regular supply of fresh cadavers, one would be justified in raising questions about the moral appropriateness of the hospital's co-operation with the suppliers' (44).
Similarly, would not a doctor in Nazi Germany who was regularly supplied for his research with the corpses of gassed Jews incur moral guilt for complicity in the systematic atrocities from which his work benefited? Such analogies may or may not be persuasive, but did they not merit consideration by the committee?
The committee goes on to conclude that, since it does not accept that fetal material resulting from an induced abortion is morally tainted, the recipient has no right to know whether it is the result of a spontaneous or induced abortion (45) , although medical and nursing staff should have a right of conscientious objection to participation in the use of fetal material for research or therapy (46) . If, however, there is no moral taint attaching to the fetal material, it is not clear why staff should have a right to refuse nor why, if staff have that right, patients should not.
COMPLICITY IN FUTURE ABORTIONS
A no less trenchant objection to the use of fetal tissue, which is again dealt with less than convincingly by the committee, has been well made by Bopp and Burtchaell, namely, that fetal use may not only entail complicity in abortions which produced the fetuses but may also involve complicity in the future abortions it may encourage.
(a) Aborting in order to produce fetal tissue The new code's attempt to separate the decision to abort from that to use the resulting fetal tissue reflects the committee's belief that it is unethical to allow the prospect of the use of fetal tissue to encourage abortion. The report asserts that abortion and the use of fetal tissue thereby obtained are 'separate moral questions' and that it is of great importance that this should be reflected in the procedures employed (47) . It adds that the generation of a pregnancy to provide tissue would be unethical as it would involve treating the fetus as a thing. The report consequently recommends the separation of the decisions to terminate pregnancy and to use the resulting tissue, and the creation of procedures which will make it impossible for the woman to specify that the tissue should be used in a particular way (48) .
The report's reasoning seems inconsistent. In particular, it is difficult to see why the report takes such pains to separate the decision to abort from that to use the material when it does not regard abortion as immoral in the first place. Although the report is unclear about the circumstances in which abortion is unethical, it rejects the view that abortion is always immoral. It states that the destruction of the unborn fetus is permitted under the Abortion Act 1967 'only in situations where there are also other serious moral issues to be considered, such as those arising from concern for the health of the mother' (49) ; that the situation is one in which a number of possible conflicting moral factors are involved and that the fact that there may be differing views about whether these factors have been correctly weighed does not mean that abortion is inevitably wrong (50) ; and that abortion is 'a decision of moral ambiguity and perplexity for many, reached only through a conflict of considerations' (51) .
Yet, if abortion in the interests of the woman's health is morally acceptable, it is surely inconsistent to conclude that an abortion to provide tissue is not justifiable in the service of those same interests. A clear example would be where the tissue is required to treat an illness of her own. But is there any reason why her health could not benefit even if the tissue were required for another, particularly her child, spouse or parent? It is noteworthy, in view of the committee's reference to the abortion Act 1967, that such abortions would be as lawful as any other abortions performed in the interests of the woman's health. Indeed, the Act specifically permits abortion in cases where the risk to the health of any existing children from continuing the pregnancy is greater than the risk from terminating it (52) . Further, it may well be that an abortion to provide tissue for another is, not least because of its altruistic motive, a weightier reason than a number of others currently accepted by many as ethical.
As Robertson points out, the morality of abortion to provide tissue for the woman or another 'depends on the value placed on early fetuses and on the acceptable reasons for abortion'. He concludes: 'There is no sound ethical basis for prohibiting this sacrifice of the fetus when its sacrifice to end an unwanted pregnancy or pursue other goals is permitted' (53).
(b) Conceiving in order to produce fetal tissue Nor is it clear why, if abortion is ethical, it is unethical to generate a pregnancy in order to provide tissue. The report claims that this would be to treat the fetus instrumentally but omits to explain how this is any different from aborting the fetus in the interests of the mother's health. Surely a fetus which is destroyed in order to promote the woman's health is being used no less instrumentally -as a means to an end -than one generated and terminated for that purpose (54)? (c) Abortion, research and moral consistency If abortion in the interests of the woman's health is ethical, and a termination of a pregnancy is carried out in the interests of the woman's health, then it is ex hypothesi ethical whether its purpose is to provide tissue (whether for herself or another) or not, and whether the fetus was deliberately generated for that purpose or not. Indeed, is the threat to a woman's health from continuing a pregnancy which she generated solely to provide tissue not likely to be even greater than that from continuing a pregnancy which was either originally wanted or simply unplanned?
All this is not to disagree with the committee's opposition to the deliberate destruction of a fetus to provide tissue, whether generated for this purpose or not. On the contrary, it is submitted that its opposition is wholly warranted. But it is submitted that it is only possible to hold this position consistently if abortion for other purported justifications, such as preserving the woman's health, is equally opposed. Indeed, would such a position not be more in harmony with the committee's assessment of the moral status of the fetus?
The report concludes that the fetus, because of its potential for development into a fully developed human being, merits a 'special status' and 'profound respect' (55), and it recommends that, in the context of research, it be treated according to principles broadly similar to those which apply to children and adults (56). These principles, as contained in the Declaration of Helsinki, emphasise that the interests of the individual take precedence over the interests of science and society.
If being subjected to harmful research or being aborted to produce tissue is inconsistent with 'profound respect' and with principles 'broadly similar' to those adopted at Helsinki, why is abortion for other reasons not also inconsistent with them?
The counter-argument that in the context of abortion the interests of the fetus may conflict with those of the mother surely fails, for such conflict (whether between the fetus and the mother and/or others) may equally exist in the context of research and therapy.
In short, if the committee's principles rule out harmful research and abortion to produce tissue, it is difficult to see why they do not also rule out abortion for other reasons. Conversely, if they do not rule out abortion for other reasons, it is difficult to see why they rule out harmful research and abortion to produce tissue.
Conclusions
The Polkinghorne Committee is to be applauded for its comprehensive improvement of the Code of Practice and in particular for the recommendations removing the distinction between the viable and previable fetus, requiring maternal consent, and entrenching the principle of 'separation'.
On the other hand, the reasoning behind the committee's exclusion of the pre-implantation fetus and its rejection of a requirement of paternal consent or consultation are open to criticism. Moreover 
